US v. Gary, 09-2862, concerned a challenge to the district court’s imposition of a 12 months and 1 day imprisonment upon a defendant in a prosecution for bankruptcy fraud, for failing to disclose that his ex-wife had received a substantial monetary settlement for a workers’ compensation claim just days before filing their joint Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition.  In affirming the sentence, the court held that the district court gave the family issue sufficient consideration as shown by its efforts to arrange for defendant and his ex-wife to serve staggered prison sentences for their joint crimes.

Related Resources:

• Full text of US v. Gorman
• Full text of US v. Gary

US v. Gary, 09-2862, concerned a challenge to the district court’s imposition of a 12 months and 1 day imprisonment upon a defendant in a prosecution for bankruptcy fraud, for failing to disclose that his ex-wife had received a substantial monetary settlement for a workers’ compensation claim just days before filing their joint Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition.  In affirming the sentence, the court held that the district court gave the family issue sufficient consideration as shown by its efforts to arrange for defendant and his ex-wife to serve staggered prison sentences for their joint crimes.

Related Resources:

• Full text of US v. Gorman
• Full text of US v. Gary

Prime Eagle Group Ltd. v. Steel Dynamics, Inc., 09-1663, concerned a steel mill company’s assignee’s suit against a defendant, who had contracted with the company to help develop running a steel mini-mill located in Thailand and to lend assistance in raising capital, claiming that it chose fraud as its means of exit and must pay damages in tort.  In affirming the district court’s entry of judgment for defendant in concluding the suit untimely under the six-year statute of limitations in Indiana, the court held that the company’s president’s knowledge is imputed to the company and thus, the company knew in fall 1998 that defendant’s assertions were false, or at least questionable enough to justify an investigation.  Therefore, the company’s injury began no later than July 1999 when its investors withdrew their support, left the plant idle, and threw the firm into insolvency.

Marion County Coroner’s Office v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n, 09-3595, concerned a coroner’s office’s petition for review of a finding by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) administrative law judge’s (ALJ) finding that the coroner’s office took action against a white chief deputy coroner, based on his race and in retaliation for an internal complaint that he filed against a coroner, an African-American male.  The court denied the petition in part, and granted in part, and vacated the compensatory damages award.  The court held there was substantial evidence of race discrimination.  However, the evidence in this case does not come close to supporting the $200,000 award for compensatory damages, as based on review of the evidence and comparable cases, a remittitur to $20,000 would keep the award within rational limits.

Gburek v. Litton Loan Servicing LP, 08-3776, concerned a challenge to the district court’s grant of defendant’s motion to dismiss in a homeowner’s suit against her mortgage service provider, claiming that it had engaged in illegal debt-collection practices in violation of the Fair Debt Collection practices Act (FDCPA).  In reversing the dismissal, the court held that, generally, a communication from a debt collector to a debtor is not covered by the FDCPA unless it is made in connection with the collection of any debt, and here, plaintiff’s mortgage was in default, and the text of the letters indicate they were sent to induce her to settle her mortgage-loan debt in order to avoid foreclosure.  Therefore, the complaint sufficiently alleges communications that were sent in connection with an attempt to collect a debt, and in violation of the FDCPA.

Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Illinois v. Organon Teknika Corp. LLC., 09-3375, concerned a university’s suit against a subsidiary of the pharmaceutical manufacturer Merck & Co., and its licensee of some intellectual property rights needed to make a certain cancer drug, seeking to compel the subsidiary to resume arbitration concerning reopening the royalty rate.  In vacating the district court’s dismissal of the suit on the ground that there was no dispute to resolve because the arbitrator had not made a final award, the court remanded with instructions to enter a judgment dismissing the suit with prejudice as defendant is entitled to a decision on the merits as Rule 60(c)(1) gives the parties one year to present newly discovered evidence in support of a motion under Rule 60(b)(2), and here, the parties bargained for a final and conclusive decision, not for perpetual arbitration.

Related Resources:

• Full text of US v. Alaka
• Full text of Prime Eagle Group Ltd. v. Steel Dynamics, Inc
• Full text of Marion County Coroner’s Office v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n
• Full text of Gburek v. Litton Loan Servicing LP,
• Full text of Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Illinois v. Organon Teknika Corp. LLC

Prime Eagle Group Ltd. v. Steel Dynamics, Inc., 09-1663, concerned a steel mill company’s assignee’s suit against a defendant, who had contracted with the company to help develop running a steel mini-mill located in Thailand and to lend assistance in raising capital, claiming that it chose fraud as its means of exit and must pay damages in tort.  In affirming the district court’s entry of judgment for defendant in concluding the suit untimely under the six-year statute of limitations in Indiana, the court held that the company’s president’s knowledge is imputed to the company and thus, the company knew in fall 1998 that defendant’s assertions were false, or at least questionable enough to justify an investigation.  Therefore, the company’s injury began no later than July 1999 when its investors withdrew their support, left the plant idle, and threw the firm into insolvency.

Marion County Coroner’s Office v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n, 09-3595, concerned a coroner’s office’s petition for review of a finding by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) administrative law judge’s (ALJ) finding that the coroner’s office took action against a white chief deputy coroner, based on his race and in retaliation for an internal complaint that he filed against a coroner, an African-American male.  The court denied the petition in part, and granted in part, and vacated the compensatory damages award.  The court held there was substantial evidence of race discrimination.  However, the evidence in this case does not come close to supporting the $200,000 award for compensatory damages, as based on review of the evidence and comparable cases, a remittitur to $20,000 would keep the award within rational limits.

Gburek v. Litton Loan Servicing LP, 08-3776, concerned a challenge to the district court’s grant of defendant’s motion to dismiss in a homeowner’s suit against her mortgage service provider, claiming that it had engaged in illegal debt-collection practices in violation of the Fair Debt Collection practices Act (FDCPA).  In reversing the dismissal, the court held that, generally, a communication from a debt collector to a debtor is not covered by the FDCPA unless it is made in connection with the collection of any debt, and here, plaintiff’s mortgage was in default, and the text of the letters indicate they were sent to induce her to settle her mortgage-loan debt in order to avoid foreclosure.  Therefore, the complaint sufficiently alleges communications that were sent in connection with an attempt to collect a debt, and in violation of the FDCPA.

Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Illinois v. Organon Teknika Corp. LLC., 09-3375, concerned a university’s suit against a subsidiary of the pharmaceutical manufacturer Merck & Co., and its licensee of some intellectual property rights needed to make a certain cancer drug, seeking to compel the subsidiary to resume arbitration concerning reopening the royalty rate.  In vacating the district court’s dismissal of the suit on the ground that there was no dispute to resolve because the arbitrator had not made a final award, the court remanded with instructions to enter a judgment dismissing the suit with prejudice as defendant is entitled to a decision on the merits as Rule 60(c)(1) gives the parties one year to present newly discovered evidence in support of a motion under Rule 60(b)(2), and here, the parties bargained for a final and conclusive decision, not for perpetual arbitration.

Related Resources:

• Full text of US v. Alaka
• Full text of Prime Eagle Group Ltd. v. Steel Dynamics, Inc
• Full text of Marion County Coroner’s Office v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm’n
• Full text of Gburek v. Litton Loan Servicing LP,
• Full text of Bd. of Tr. of the Univ. of Illinois v. Organon Teknika Corp. LLC

Borovsky v. Holder, 09-3104, concerned a petition for review, by a citizen of Ukraine, of an order of the BIA denying his application for withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).  In denying the petition, the court held that, although the BIA’s apparent misunderstanding that Eighth Circuit law controlled does not undermine its primary ground of decision, that petitioner failed to show persecution under the standard for withholding of removal, the BIA’s Eighth Circuit case citations did not affect the outcome.  The court also held that the denial of petitioner’s claims for withholding or removal and CAT protection is supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence.

Anderson v. Aon Corp., 09-1144, concerned a challenge to the district court’s judgment dismissing plaintiff’s complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) after determining that Illinois law supplies the rule of decision in plaintiff’s suit against a corporation alleging a holder claim under California law and RICO, the latter claim which plaintiff dismissed, claiming that but for the corporation’s fraud, he would have sold the stock before its price dropped.  In reversing and remanding, the court held that California would elect to use its own law and would entertain plaintiff’s holder action as plaintiff is a citizen of California, he sold his business in California to defendant and received the corporation’s stock there.

Related Resources:

• Full text of US v. Ciesiolka
• Full text of Borovsky v. Holder
• Full text of Anderson v. Aon Corp

Borovsky v. Holder, 09-3104, concerned a petition for review, by a citizen of Ukraine, of an order of the BIA denying his application for withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).  In denying the petition, the court held that, although the BIA’s apparent misunderstanding that Eighth Circuit law controlled does not undermine its primary ground of decision, that petitioner failed to show persecution under the standard for withholding of removal, the BIA’s Eighth Circuit case citations did not affect the outcome.  The court also held that the denial of petitioner’s claims for withholding or removal and CAT protection is supported by reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence.

Anderson v. Aon Corp., 09-1144, concerned a challenge to the district court’s judgment dismissing plaintiff’s complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) after determining that Illinois law supplies the rule of decision in plaintiff’s suit against a corporation alleging a holder claim under California law and RICO, the latter claim which plaintiff dismissed, claiming that but for the corporation’s fraud, he would have sold the stock before its price dropped.  In reversing and remanding, the court held that California would elect to use its own law and would entertain plaintiff’s holder action as plaintiff is a citizen of California, he sold his business in California to defendant and received the corporation’s stock there.

Related Resources:

• Full text of US v. Ciesiolka
• Full text of Borovsky v. Holder
• Full text of Anderson v. Aon Corp

US v. Sanders, 09-1119, concerned a challenge to a conviction of defendant for being a felon in possession of a firearm and a 105-month sentence.  In affirming both the conviction and the sentence, the court held that the district court’s limitation on the exploration of the Miranda issue, if error at all, was harmless, and that defendant’s challenge to the district court’s application of a two-level sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice is frivolous.

Portis v. City of Chicago, 09-1498, concerned a class action lawsuit against the city of Chicago, alleging that taking more than two hours to perform the steps needed to get from the generation of a Central Booking number to an arrestee’s release makes the detention unreasonable and violates the Fourth Amendment.  The court reversed the district court’s two-hour rule in agreeing with the plaintiffs, in concluding that the district court did not explain why it set a time limit for a particular part of the process.  Furthermore, what is reasonable or not is how much time passes between arrest and release, in relation to the reasons for detention, the time for each step along the way is not subject to an independent limit. The court also held that, because reasonableness is a standard rather than a rule, and because one detainee’s circumstances differ from another’s, common questions do not predominate and class certification is inappropriate.

Related Resources:

• Full text of Ward v. Jenkins
• Full text of US v. Sanders
• Full text of Portis v. City of Chicago

US v. Sanders, 09-1119, concerned a challenge to a conviction of defendant for being a felon in possession of a firearm and a 105-month sentence.  In affirming both the conviction and the sentence, the court held that the district court’s limitation on the exploration of the Miranda issue, if error at all, was harmless, and that defendant’s challenge to the district court’s application of a two-level sentencing enhancement for obstruction of justice is frivolous.

Portis v. City of Chicago, 09-1498, concerned a class action lawsuit against the city of Chicago, alleging that taking more than two hours to perform the steps needed to get from the generation of a Central Booking number to an arrestee’s release makes the detention unreasonable and violates the Fourth Amendment.  The court reversed the district court’s two-hour rule in agreeing with the plaintiffs, in concluding that the district court did not explain why it set a time limit for a particular part of the process.  Furthermore, what is reasonable or not is how much time passes between arrest and release, in relation to the reasons for detention, the time for each step along the way is not subject to an independent limit. The court also held that, because reasonableness is a standard rather than a rule, and because one detainee’s circumstances differ from another’s, common questions do not predominate and class certification is inappropriate.

Related Resources:

• Full text of Ward v. Jenkins
• Full text of US v. Sanders
• Full text of Portis v. City of Chicago

Roadway Express, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 09-1315, concerned a defendant-employer’s petition for review of the Administrative Review Board’s (ARB) decision on remand, finding that defendant failed to meet the burden of proving that it would have fired the plaintiff in the absence of his protected conduct.  In denying the petition, the court held that the ARB was entitled to find that reinstatement was an appropriate remedy in this case because there is more than enough evidentiary support for the ARB’s conclusion that plaintiff’s driving history does not indicate that he is unfit to drive a truck.

Griffith v. Rednour, 09-2518, concerned a challenge to the district court’s dismissal of defendant’s request for habeas relief for his murder conviction as untimely.  In affirming, the court held that a state proceeding is no longer pending once the state court has made its decision and the time to seek further review has expired.  Here, the year prescribed by section 2244(d)(1) expired on November 17, 2006 and defendant’s federal petition was 13 days late.  Lastly, the court held that defendant’s counsel’s negligence does not extend the time for filing a collateral attack.

FM Indus., Inc. v. Citicorp Credit Serv., Inc., 08-3154, involved a suit for copyright infringement, related to a computer software designed to help lawyers to collect debts and lenders to monitor how its lawyers are doing.  In affirming the judgment of the district court for the most part, the court held that the district judge properly dismissed the complaint for lack of prosecution, and also held that the judgment ordering plaintiff to pay defendants’ legal fees under 28 U.S.C. section 1927 for vexatiously multiplying the proceedings was proper.  However, the court reversed the district judge’s award of fees against a copyright specialist who assisted defendant’s counsel, as personal responsibility is essential to an award of sanctions under section 1927.

Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Munroe, 09-3427, concerned an insurer’s action for declaratory judgment, arising from a settlement agreement between the plaintiffs in the underlying suit releasing those responsible for causing a severe tractor-trailer accident from any individual liability above their liability insurance coverage.  In affirming the district court’s grant of the insurer’s motion for summary judgment the court held that the insurance policy unambiguously limits coverage to $1,000,000 per occurrence, and here, there was a single occurrence because there was a single continuous event.  Court also held that the MCS-90 endorsement does not affect the insurer’s liability because it applies only if triggered by an unpaid final judgment against one of the defendants in the underlying suit.

Related Resources:

• Full text of US v. Rappe
• Full text of Roadway Express, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor
• Full text of Griffith v. Rednour
• Full text of FM Indus., Inc. v. Citicorp Credit Serv., Inc
• Full text of Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Munroe

Qiu v. Holder, No. 09-3512, concerned a Chinese citizen’s petition for review of the BIA’s affirmance of an IJ’s denial of his application for asylum on the ground that petitioner failed to establish that he was subject to a well-founded fear of persecution upon return to China.  In granting the petition, the court held that the evidence establishes that the State Department reports and petitioner’s own credited testimony established that he is a Falun Gong practitioner, that the practice of Falun Gong is outlawed in China, that the Chinese police knew that he is a Falun Gong practitioner, that the practice of Falun Gong is outlawed in China, that the Chinese police know he practices Falun Gong, that China persecutes Falun Gong practitioners, and that the only way petitioner can avoid persecution is to cease the practice of Falun Gong or hope to evade discovery.

Related Resources:

• Full text of US v. Nance
• Full text of Qiu v. Holder