US v. Bankoff, 08-3275, concerned a prosecution of defendant for threatening two employees of the Social Security Administration in violation of section 115 of Title 18 of the United States Code, making it a crime to “threaten to assault, kidnap, or murder…an official whose killing would be a crime under” section 1114, which in turn, makes it a crime to kill “any officer or employee of the United States or of any agency in any branch of the United States Government.”

In vacating in part, the court held that the district court erred in ruling that an individual does not qualify as an “official” within the meaning of section 115 unless he or she is “authorized to make decisions on behalf of the government” as section 115 incorporates by reference all persons covered by section 1114, and accordingly, section 115 applies to threats against federal employees whose killing would be a crime under section 1114. Thus, because section 115 applies to both employees defendant threatened, district court’s denial of a judgment of acquittal on count two is affirmed, but the district court’s grant of judgment of acquittal on count three is vacated and remanded.  Lastly, defendant’s Sixth Amendment violation claim is rejected.

Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc. v. Botticella, 10-1510, concerned a challenge to the district court’s grant of plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction in plaintiff’s suit for preliminary injunctive relief against its former vice president of operations, following defendant’s acceptance of a senior executive position with plaintiff’s competitor, Hostess Brands, seeking to protect its trade secrets involving plaintiff’s popular line of Thomas’ English Muffins, of which defendant was one of only seven people who possessed all of the knowledge necessary to replicate the muffins. 

In affirming, the court held that the district court had discretion to enjoin defendant from working at Hostess to the extent this proposed employment threatened to lead to the misappropriation of trade secrets.  The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that plaintiff demonstrated a likelihood of success on its misappropriation of trade secrets claim, nor when, faced with evidence of defendant’s suspicious conduct during his final weeks at plaintiff, it determined that a stronger remedy was needed in the interim to protect plaintiff from imminent irreparable harm.  Court further held that the district court was correct in concluding that the harm of plaintiff’s trade secrets being disclosed to Hostess outweighed the harm to defendant of not being able to commence employment at Hostess until the court made a final determination of the merits following a trial, and that the district court was correct in concluding that the public interest in preventing the misappropriation of plaintiff’s trade secrets outweighs the temporary restriction of defendant’s choice of employment.

Related Resources:

• Full text of US v. Flemming
• Full text of Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc. v. Botticella
• Full text of US v. Bankoff,

US v. Bankoff, 08-3275, concerned a prosecution of defendant for threatening two employees of the Social Security Administration in violation of section 115 of Title 18 of the United States Code, making it a crime to “threaten to assault, kidnap, or murder…an official whose killing would be a crime under” section 1114, which in turn, makes it a crime to kill “any officer or employee of the United States or of any agency in any branch of the United States Government.”

In vacating in part, the court held that the district court erred in ruling that an individual does not qualify as an “official” within the meaning of section 115 unless he or she is “authorized to make decisions on behalf of the government” as section 115 incorporates by reference all persons covered by section 1114, and accordingly, section 115 applies to threats against federal employees whose killing would be a crime under section 1114. Thus, because section 115 applies to both employees defendant threatened, district court’s denial of a judgment of acquittal on count two is affirmed, but the district court’s grant of judgment of acquittal on count three is vacated and remanded.  Lastly, defendant’s Sixth Amendment violation claim is rejected.

Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc. v. Botticella, 10-1510, concerned a challenge to the district court’s grant of plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction in plaintiff’s suit for preliminary injunctive relief against its former vice president of operations, following defendant’s acceptance of a senior executive position with plaintiff’s competitor, Hostess Brands, seeking to protect its trade secrets involving plaintiff’s popular line of Thomas’ English Muffins, of which defendant was one of only seven people who possessed all of the knowledge necessary to replicate the muffins. 

In affirming, the court held that the district court had discretion to enjoin defendant from working at Hostess to the extent this proposed employment threatened to lead to the misappropriation of trade secrets.  The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that plaintiff demonstrated a likelihood of success on its misappropriation of trade secrets claim, nor when, faced with evidence of defendant’s suspicious conduct during his final weeks at plaintiff, it determined that a stronger remedy was needed in the interim to protect plaintiff from imminent irreparable harm.  Court further held that the district court was correct in concluding that the harm of plaintiff’s trade secrets being disclosed to Hostess outweighed the harm to defendant of not being able to commence employment at Hostess until the court made a final determination of the merits following a trial, and that the district court was correct in concluding that the public interest in preventing the misappropriation of plaintiff’s trade secrets outweighs the temporary restriction of defendant’s choice of employment.

Related Resources:

• Full text of US v. Flemming
• Full text of Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc. v. Botticella
• Full text of US v. Bankoff,

In affirming the district court’s grant of defendants’ motions for summary judgment, the court adopted a general rule that the Sherman Act does not forbid sanctioning bodies and other sport-related organizations from freely adopting exclusive equipment requirements, so long as such organizations otherwise possess, in good faith, sufficient pro-competitive or business justifications for their actions.  The court held that the district court was correct to grant summary judgment in favor of the defendants because of plaintiffs’ failure to meet the antitrust injury requirement, and also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion on rejecting a last minute attempt to amend a pleading for the fourth time.

Related Resource:

• Full text of Race Tires Am., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp

US v. Bankoff, 08-3275, concerned a prosecution of defendant for threatening two employees of the Social Security Administration in violation of section 115 of Title 18 of the United States Code, making it a crime to “threaten to assault, kidnap, or murder…an official whose killing would be a crime under” section 1114, which in turn, makes it a crime to kill “any officer or employee of the United States or of any agency in any branch of the United States Government.”

In vacating in part, the court held that the district court erred in ruling that an individual does not qualify as an “official” within the meaning of section 115 unless he or she is “authorized to make decisions on behalf of the government” as section 115 incorporates by reference all persons covered by section 1114, and accordingly, section 115 applies to threats against federal employees whose killing would be a crime under section 1114. Thus, because section 115 applies to both employees defendant threatened, district court’s denial of a judgment of acquittal on count two is affirmed, but the district court’s grant of judgment of acquittal on count three is vacated and remanded.  Lastly, defendant’s Sixth Amendment violation claim is rejected.

Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc. v. Botticella, 10-1510, concerned a challenge to the district court’s grant of plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction in plaintiff’s suit for preliminary injunctive relief against its former vice president of operations, following defendant’s acceptance of a senior executive position with plaintiff’s competitor, Hostess Brands, seeking to protect its trade secrets involving plaintiff’s popular line of Thomas’ English Muffins, of which defendant was one of only seven people who possessed all of the knowledge necessary to replicate the muffins. 

In affirming, the court held that the district court had discretion to enjoin defendant from working at Hostess to the extent this proposed employment threatened to lead to the misappropriation of trade secrets.  The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that plaintiff demonstrated a likelihood of success on its misappropriation of trade secrets claim, nor when, faced with evidence of defendant’s suspicious conduct during his final weeks at plaintiff, it determined that a stronger remedy was needed in the interim to protect plaintiff from imminent irreparable harm.  Court further held that the district court was correct in concluding that the harm of plaintiff’s trade secrets being disclosed to Hostess outweighed the harm to defendant of not being able to commence employment at Hostess until the court made a final determination of the merits following a trial, and that the district court was correct in concluding that the public interest in preventing the misappropriation of plaintiff’s trade secrets outweighs the temporary restriction of defendant’s choice of employment.

Related Resources:

• Full text of US v. Flemming
• Full text of Bimbo Bakeries USA, Inc. v. Botticella
• Full text of US v. Bankoff,

In affirming the district court’s grant of defendants’ motions for summary judgment, the court adopted a general rule that the Sherman Act does not forbid sanctioning bodies and other sport-related organizations from freely adopting exclusive equipment requirements, so long as such organizations otherwise possess, in good faith, sufficient pro-competitive or business justifications for their actions.  The court held that the district court was correct to grant summary judgment in favor of the defendants because of plaintiffs’ failure to meet the antitrust injury requirement, and also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion on rejecting a last minute attempt to amend a pleading for the fourth time.

Related Resource:

• Full text of Race Tires Am., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp

In affirming the district court’s grant of defendants’ motions for summary judgment, the court adopted a general rule that the Sherman Act does not forbid sanctioning bodies and other sport-related organizations from freely adopting exclusive equipment requirements, so long as such organizations otherwise possess, in good faith, sufficient pro-competitive or business justifications for their actions.  The court held that the district court was correct to grant summary judgment in favor of the defendants because of plaintiffs’ failure to meet the antitrust injury requirement, and also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion on rejecting a last minute attempt to amend a pleading for the fourth time.

Related Resource:

• Full text of Race Tires Am., Inc. v. Hoosier Racing Tire Corp

In re Visteon Corp., 10-1944, concerned a union’s challenge to the district court’s order affirming a bankruptcy court’s order permitting defendant-employer to terminate provision of retiree health and life insurance benefits without complying with 11 U.S.C. section 1114.  In reversing the judgment, the court held that the rule of statutory construction allowing a court to ignore the plain language of a statute when literal interpretation results in absurdity is entirely inapplicable, and here, a literal interpretation of section 1114 reveals a remedial and equitable statutory scheme that, consistent with Congress’ concerns when enacting the RBBPA, attempts to prevent the human dimension of terminating retiree benefits from being obscured by the business of bankruptcy.

Ferren C. v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 09-1587, concerned a challenge to the district court’s various orders against the defendant in plaintiff’s suit challenging the administrative decisions of a hearing officer and appeals panel, that the school district was not required to provide plaintiff with an IEP during the three-year compensatory period.  In affirming the district court’s judgment ordering the school district, for the duration of plaintiff’s three years of compensatory education, to annually reevaluate plaintiff, provide her with annual IEPs, and serve as her Local Education Agency, the court held that the district court had equitable power under the IDEA to grant relief of this nature and the relief furthers the purposes of the IDEA.

Related Resourcces:

• Full text of Sullivan v. DB Inv. Inc
• Full text of In re Visteon Corp
• Full text of Ferren C. v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia

In affirming in part, the court held that defendant is not entitled to a new trial on a rifle charge as all of the Pelullo factors indicate that there was no prejudicial spillover from the pistol charge to the rifle charge.  The court also affirmed the district court’s decision to admit evidence that defendant was wearing a bullet-proof vest at time of the arrest as it was not arbitrary or irrational. The court held that defendant’s statements regarding his prior possession of firearms were admissible for a proper purpose under Rule 404(b) as evidence of defendant’s motive for possessing a weapon, the statements are relevant under Rule 402, and the district court’s finding under Rule 403 that the danger of unfair prejudicial effect did not substantially outweigh the probative value of the statements was not arbitrary and irrational. The court also held that a new trial is not warranted because it is highly probable that  prosecutorial misconduct did not contribute to the judgment.  However, the court vacated and remanded  defendant’s sentence for resentencing as his earlier conviction for reckless conduct, standing alone, does not qualify as a crime of violence. 

Related Resource:

• Full text of US v. Lee

Related Resource:

• Full text of US v. Gatlin

In vacating the judgment and remanding the matter, the court held that the district court incorrectly concluded that Argentina’s declaration, opting out of the provision in the Convention allowing a contract to be proved even if it was not in writing, imposed a writing requirements and that the absence of a written contract in this case precluded the plaintiff’s claim.  Therefore, where, as here, one party’s country of incorporation has made a declaration while the other’s has not, a court must first decide, based on the forum state’s choice-of-law rules, which forum’s law applies, and then apply the law of the forum designated by the choice-of-law analysis.

Related Resource:

• Full text of Forestal Guarani S.A. v. Daros Int’l, Inc.,